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I - Introduction and Hypothesis 
 This thesis will examine how attitudes in Japan towards the shared wartime history 
between Japan and Taiwan have changed since the end of the World War II (WWII) up to the 
present day. I have chosen to examine these attitudes in three periods. The first period runs 
from the end of WWII up to the Japanese transfer of recognition from Taiwan to China as the 
legitimate government of China in 1972.
1
 The transfer of recognition from the ROC 
(Republic of China, also known as Taiwan) to the PRC (People's Republic of China) 
constituted an important change in Japan's relations with Taiwan, shifting the emphasis to the 
PRC which thus makes 1972 a suitable time to end the first period I will examine. The second 
period runs from the end of the first period to 1992. The first full election to the Taiwanese 
legislature was held in 1992
2
 and this demonstration that Taiwan had democratised 
significantly improved Taiwan's reputation in Japan.
3
 This boost to Taiwan's reputation in 
Japan occurred almost synchronously with the end of the Cold War which greatly affected 
Japan's international relations, thus making 1992 a suitable point to terminate the second 
period of my examination. The final period begins in 1992 and continues to the present day 
and is concerned with how attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime 
history has continued to change in light of developments since 1992, such as the development 
of the PRC, increasing nationalism in Japan and political change in Taiwan. The subheadings 
that I will use in the second, third and forth sections represent aspects through which I will 
analyse what Japanese attitudes were and are and how and why these attitudes changed. I will 
therefore be writing about how people in Japan have thought about Japan and Taiwan's 
shared wartime history, how such attitudes have been expressed and why those attitudes have 
changed over time.  
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 This thesis is important because it is concerned with war memory in Japan and to a 
lesser extent in Taiwan. War memory and the debates that come from different memories 
continue to exert a pernicious effect upon East Asian politics.
4
 An exploration of how 
memories of shared experiences change and why they change is important because it can 
reveal how war memory is expressed and also what factors can change the attitudes that war 
memory produces. An understanding of how the attitudes created from war memories are 
expressed and how they are shaped can help in the cultivation of attitudes that reflect the truth 
and the expunging of those that spring from deception. In addition, an understanding of how 
attitudes towards shared wartime history affect the generally positive Japan-Taiwan 
relationship may reveal how shared wartime experiences may be used to repair, rather than 
ravage Japan's relationships with countries such as China and South Korea, with whom 
Japan's relations are far worse than Japan-Taiwan relations. 
 I hypothesise that attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime 
history have moved from a position of cultivated ignorance in the first period I will discuss to 
one of tentative discussion in the second period. During the third period, I hypothesise that 
attitudes have become increasingly polarised with resurgent nationalists defending everything 
connected to Japan in Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime history and pacifists and socialists 
decrying what the nationalists praise. I hypothesise that this political polarisation has affected 
the population at large and that there is a much more varied and vociferous assortment of 
attitudes on the topic of Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime history since the early 1990s that 
there was before. With regards to why these attitudes have changed, I hypothesise that 
attitudes in the early period (1945-1972) were largely the result of internal factors in Japan 
such as public sentiment and occupation policy. In the middle period (1972-1992) internal 
factors were still important but outside factors, especially the end of the Cold War and the 
                                                          
4
 Farley, R (2015, December) Why Post-WWII Reconciliation Failed in East Asia. The Diplomat 
4 
 
growing economic and political importance of other countries in East Asia was having an 
increasing effect on Japanese attitudes. Finally, the late period (1992-present day) has been 
affected by a combination of internal and external factors, some of which are the result of 
non-state actors compared to the domination of states in the sculpting of attitudes which was 
more accurate in the earlier periods. 
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II - Attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime history from 1945 until 
1972 
 I will now examine how attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared 
wartime history from 1945 to 1972 by looking at how different ways in which these attitudes 
were expressed. 
1. The treatment of Taiwanese nationals by Japanese nationals 
 After the end of WWII, Taiwanese living in Japan who had formerly been Japanese 
subjects lost their Japanese nationality and became foreigners resident in Japan.
5
 The 
treatment meted out to these Taiwanese who had only recently lost their Japanese nationality, 
both on the part of the Japanese authorities and the Japanese population indicate that any kind 
of comradeship or fraternity which had existed during WWII was swiftly extirpated.  Kushner 
has noted that Taiwanese resident in Japan who had formerly held Japanese nationality were 
known as kimin (棄民), meaning abandoned people, showing that these Taiwanese who were 
results of  the shared Japan-Taiwan wartime experience were the object of contempt in the 
eyes of the Japanese population. The inferior legal status of Taiwanese compared to Japanese, 
along with the involvement of  Taiwanese in the black market due to economic difficulties 
exacerbated relations between the two groups, which were hardly harmonious even during 
the empire.
6
 Kushner points to the Shibuya Incident of 17th July 1946 in which an argument 
between a Taiwanese national and a Japanese police officer quickly escalated into a conflict 
involving the police, a Japanese gang and more Taiwanese individuals.
7
 This conflict 
demonstrates the hostility which prevailed between the Taiwanese living in Japan and the 
Japanese and shows rather than the shared wartime history bringing the two groups together, 
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the Taiwanese were economically marginalised and looked down upon by the Japanese 
public. The arrest of forty Taiwanese after the Shibuya incident led to the intervention of the 
Chinese Nationalist government which successfully pressured the Allied occupation 
authorities to place on trial the police officers involved in the incident.
8
 Continuing pressure 
from representatives of the Nationalist government led to the occupation authorities to agree 
to register all Taiwanese and Chinese registered by the Chinese diplomatic mission as United 
Nations citizens.
9
 Furthermore, although citizens of Nationalist China were made to register 
as foreigners, they did gain diplomatic representation and removal from Japanese criminal 
jurisdiction, rights not afforded to Koreans in Japan.
10
 It is important to note here that the 
rights and representation gained by Chinese in Japan were acquired through Nationalist 
pressure on the occupation authorities, rather than any willingness from the Japanese 
themselves. . Indeed, the pejorative term ‘third country nationals’(第三国人 - Dai Sankokujin) 
used to refer to Chinese and Koreans by Japanese and a speech by Diet member Saburo 
Shiikuma in which he said “We refuse to stand in silence watching Formosans and 
Koreans…swaggering about as if there were the nationals of victorious nations” show that 
Taiwanese in immediate postwar Japan were held in open contempt by both the Japanese 
public and political elites.
11
 The stark division in the late 1940s in Japan between Japanese 
and Taiwanese and the suspicion and contempt shown to the Taiwanese by both the Japanese 
public and political elites show that the shared wartime history had been shunted aside and 
neither politicians nor the public in Japan paid the history of Taiwanese as soldiers or 
workers for the Japanese Empire's benefit much heed. 
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2. War Guilt, Culpability and Victimhood 
 The public perception of the Tokyo Trials, which were trials held after WWII to try 
the wartime Japanese leadership for war crimes, also showed that the Japanese public wished 
to forget the past and in doing so, disassociate themselves from the reminders of empire, such 
as the Taiwanese. Despite the censorship of the Allied General Headquarters (GHQ) which 
prohibited media defence of the defendants, and the perception that the trial constituted 
victors’ justice; the trial received widespread support from the Japanese media and was seen 
by contemporary scholars as a means to leave behind the past and permit Japan to be 
rehabilitated in the future.
12
 This shows that the Tokyo trial were seen to provide closure for 
the Japanese people through the punishment of those responsible for the war, allowing the 
rest of the population to continue without the burden of guilt. The trial sharpened the anger 
felt though Japan towards the wartime leadership, who were naturally blamed for the 
hardships of the war. The trial helped to develop this attitude to a point of victim 
consciousness, whereby the execution or imprisonment of the guilty wartime leadership 
would leave the rest of the population innocent.
13
 In addition, the Tokyo trial faded from 
public view very quickly after the conclusion of proceedings. Of the 1270 articles referring to 
the trial in the database of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, 1138 were published between 1945 
and 1948, with a mere 12 articles appearing in 1949 compared to 325 in 1948.
14
 This 
reinforces the claim that with the guilty parties imprisoned or executed, there was little more 
for the media to report on or for the populace to know as the main purpose of the trial, the 
punishment of those guilty, had already been carried out.  The Mainichi Shimbun even wrote 
on the day that seven defendants were executed in December 1948 that, “Nobody can assert 
that they are the only criminals and that all other Japanese people opposed the war … the 
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responsibility of having caused the tragedy should be shared by the whole nation.”15 This 
injunction that the populace should not consider the war to be the result of a cabal of 
politicians and generals, rather than the country at large would not need to voiced, unless 
there was already considerable numbers of people thinking exactly that. 
On the day on which sentences were declared, an editorial in the Asahi Shimbun told its 
readers “What we need to bear in mind is that this Trial demands the complete burial of the 
past Japan coloured with the militarism which was cultivated by the defendants.”16 The view 
that the Tokyo Trial constituted a part of the settlement of the war is shared by many 
Japanese up to the present day and the trial was seen as part of the Allied move towards 
demilitarisation and democratisation.
17
 However, the trials were not seen as means by which 
the Japanese public could consider how the war happened and how culpable the public at 
large were for it.
18
 For most of the Japanese population, the Tokyo Trial punished the clear 
villains of imperial Japan who had distorted Japanese modernity and with due punishment 
meted out, the country and people were clear of the imperial past and could begin again. The 
desire of the Japanese population to ascribe blame to the wartime leadership and then quickly 
move away from the past to a brighter future left no room for reflection on the shared 
wartime past with Taiwan as it constituted part of the same past that the population wished to 
lie dead and forgotten along with the convicted defendants of the Tokyo Trials.  
 During the postwar 1940s, the victimhood mentality that would emerge in late years 
was not present due to American efforts to democratise and demilitarise Japan and in doing 
so, change the identity of the Japanese  to prevent the future outbreak of war
19
; a goal that left 
no room for a victim mentality. The decision to turn Japan into a fortress against communism 
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in 1949 derailed the pacifist project and laid the seeds for the victimhood mentality.
20
  The 
victimhood mentality which nurtured the idea that the Japanese people had been the victims 
rather than aggressors during WWII and before during Japan's empire building emerged 
during the 1950s
21
 This victim mentality undermined the potential for Japanese to consider 
their shared history with Taiwan as the victim mentality placed Japanese suffering at the 
centre and denied a place for non-Japanese victims. 
 
3. Narratives of WWII disseminated by the Japanese Government in Japan 
 Japanese governments in the immediate postwar period also strove to disassociate 
Japan from its erstwhile empire through their actions inside Japan. Gluck has written that the 
postwar Japanese government attempted to expunge the wartime Japanese Empire from 
consciousness, simultaneously regretting the war and erasing memory of the empire.
22
 The 
Japanese government and US occupation jointly promoted the ideas that the past could be left 
behind and that a new Japan could begin; that the execution of the convicted war criminals by 
the Allies constituted a break with the tainted past and that the modernity represented by the 
wartime leadership was an aberration but which could now be rectified by the postwar 
leadership.
23
 The promotion of these ideas by postwar Japanese governments in the late 
1940s did not leave a place for Taiwanese who had so recently been Japanese. Just as the 
public desire to cut links with the past marginalised Taiwanese, so the desire of Japanese 
governments to forge a Japan bereft of a connection to the wartime past left the shared history 
between Japan and Taiwan an embarrassing reminder of an age that Japanese governments 
wanted to forget.  
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4. Cooperation between the Japanese and Taiwanese Governments 
 Following the end of WWII, some Japanese economic, military and political leaders 
cooperated with the Guomindang (GMD - The Nationalist Party that went on to rule Taiwan 
after their defeat by the Chinese Communist Party and expulsion from China) in China in 
economic reconstruction efforts which indicated a degree of penitence amongst the Japanese 
who assisted. Yasuji Okamura, who had been commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in 
wrote that “Japan should contribute to the future restoration of the empire and the 
reconstruction of East Asia by clearing up the misunderstanding between itself and China and 
by helping China strengthen wherever possible.”24 This wish for Japan-China cooperation 
was echoed in a dispatch to Nanjing by Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese foreign minister 
who promoted Japanese-Chinese cooperation.
25
  These views of these military and political 
elites that Japan should cooperate with China were echoed by Japanese technicians who 
stayed in China, who felt that Japan should pay for its defeat and that service in Japan would 
constitute a form or reparation for Japan's invasion.
26
 This economic cooperation between 
Japan and GMD-ruled China indicated that there was some feeling among Japanese that the 
shared wartime history necessitated acts of atonement on the Japanese side. The role of 
economic cooperation in building bridges over the past with evident to both sides, with one 
Chinese director remarking to Japanese technicians that “We do not create inequality between 
Japanese and Chinese…by taking a firm first step, we can settle the past and build the 
foundation of Sino-Japanese relations.”27 
 This rapprochement between Japanese and Chinese did not last due to a combination 
of factors, principally American suspicion that that Japanese technicians in China may be 
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harbingers of a resurgence of Japanese influence in China, pressure from the Soviet Union for 
Japan to withdraw Japanese technicians in China and the fear among the Nationalist 
Government that Japanese technicians would be captured by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)
28
 Cooperation between Japan and China that was at least partly prompted by the 
wartime history between the two countries was cut short largely due to external pressure on 
the Japanese government. A survey by the Japanese government of expatriates from 
Manchuria revealed that while many supported the idea of cooperation between Japan and 
China, there were sharp divisions in opinion, with some affirming that Japanese leadership 
was required for such cooperation to be successful.
29
 Whilst the wartime experience was a 
prominent factor motivating Japanese to assist GMD China development, the view that 
Japanese leadership was fundamental and Okamura's comments about the 'restoration of the 
empire' show that ideas of Japanese pre-eminence were still very much around. 
 
5. Taiwan's place in Japanese Diplomacy 
 Limited cooperation in the late 1940s aside, sentiment in Japan in the 1950s and the 
decisions made by the Japanese leadership illustrate a emphasis on the PRC rather than the 
ROC (Taiwan) and thus a lack of concern with the shared wartime history with Taiwan. The 
pressure the US government exerted on their Japanese counterparts to see the 1950 Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship as a threat clashed with a Japanese view that mixed a sense of 
guilt towards the PRC with a perception that communism had not thoroughly permeated the 
Chinese body politic.
30
 Shigeru Yoshida, the Japanese Prime Minister widely regarded as 
having established the fundamental of postwar Japanese foreign policy; wished to recognise 
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Beijing over Taipei. This was in contrast to the American peace treaty negotiator John Foster 
Dulles who supported Taipei over Beijing.
31
 The Japanese public overwhelmingly favoured 
full diplomatic relations with the PRC
32
, showing that both at elite and public level, attitudes 
in Japan were much more concerned with China than Taiwan. Only the influence of the US 
during Yoshida's premiership and the preponderance of American economic and political 
clout relative to Japan brought about Japanese recognition of the ROC.
33
 
 The Taipei Treaty of 1952, which ended the state of war between Japan and China 
(GMD on Taiwan) , along with the negotiations leading up to it demonstrate the aversion of 
the Japanese government to negotiating with the Nationalists. The Japanese government, 
cognisant of the value of economic ties with CCP-controlled (mainland) China treated the 
Nationalists as merely a local government on Taiwan.
34
 This would have satisfied the US 
whilst also leaving open the possibility of pursuing relations with the PRC.
35
 The negotiations 
show that the leadership was primarily concerned with the economic benefits of relations 
with the PRC and that the shared wartime history with Taiwan played no role in Japanese 
diplomatic considerations.  Crucially, despite a log tirade by the GMD representative 
enumerating the destruction caused by Japan’s invasion of China, the treaty ending war 
between (GMD) China and Japan was signed without reference to war guilt.
36
 The absence of 
any references to war guilt, along with the waiving of reparations demands that  had featured 
in the Chinese draft
37
 allowed the Japanese government to consider their obligations 
discharged by the signing of the treaty. The inclusion of references to war guilt or obligation 
on the part of Japan to pay reparations to Taiwan would have kept the shared wartime history 
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between Japan and Taiwan diplomatically relevant as the history would have explained the 
reasoning behind war guilt and reparations. Instead, the absence of such obligations meant 
that the Japanese government was able to discard the shared past with Taiwan and negotiate 
with the Taiwanese leadership without the spectre of history influencing them. 
 
6. Taiwan's image in Japan 
 The collapse of Japan's overseas empire, the triumph of the CCP in China and the 
occupation of Japan by the US and Japan's alignment on the capitalist side in the Cold War 
ensured that Japan would be economically and culturally isolated from East Asia. This 
isolation had the effect of rendering Taiwan unimportant to Japan and making it easy to 
ignore Taiwanese concerns. The usefulness of Japan to the US, as a host of American 
military bases but also as an economic barrier to prevent the spread of communism meant 
that the American occupation of Japan was more lenient than it would otherwise have been.
38
 
The integration of Japan into the capitalist  bloc and the spread of American culture
39
 meant 
that the wartime experience of Americans would not be forgotten in Japan as American 
influence and culture affected Japan enough that forgetting the US was not possible. By 
contrast, Taiwan lacked a strong cultural or economic presence in Japan during the late 1940s 
and 1950s and this meant that the wartime experiences of Taiwanese were easily forgotten.  
The low status of Taiwanese living in Japan and the perception that Taiwan was not a victor 
of WWII made it easier to dismiss the shared wartime history between Taiwan and Japan.  
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7. Identity Politics and Historiography in Taiwan 
 The fervour with which the GMD attempted to Sinify the Taiwanese population  after 
WWII and erase the Japanese past made it easier for the Japanese to ignore the shared 
wartime history because the Taiwanese attempted to extirpate that same history. The political 
importance of Sinification by the GMD has been alluded to by Jiujung Lo when she writes 
that despite possessing the trappings of Japan, such as food, clothing, language and 
dwellings, the GMD thought that sufficient Sinification of the Taiwanese could convince 
Chinese that they (the Taiwanese) remained fundamentally Chinese.
40
 The narrative of 
history that the GMD promoted in Taiwan reflected the Chinese experience of WWII and the 
Sino-Japanese War before that, not the Taiwanese experience. The historical truth that 
Taiwanese, as the Japanese Emperor's subjects had fought against Chinese during WWII was 
incompatible with this narrative.
41
 With the exception of  very infrequent media reports on 
attempts by Taiwanese veterans to gain compensation from the Japanese governments  and 
the appearance of such soldiers in a few films Taiwanese who fought for Japan were almost 
unknown in Taiwan during the 1945-1972 period.
42
 
 The conflict between the GMD and the CCP which was the foremost concern of the 
GMD after the end of Japanese rule also resulted in the hiring by the GMD of Japanese 
military personnel to train Taiwanese soldiers for the eventual conquest of China.
43
 The use 
of Japanese advisors, the GMD leader Kaishek Chiang's policy of ‘to repay hatred with 
kindness’ (以德报怨) regarding the Japanese and his view that the ‘Japanese military clique’ 
were the enemy, not the Japanese people and that revenge should not be sought upon those 
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who were innocent
44
 all indicated that while the GMD wanted to make Taiwanese into 
Chinese, they also wanted Japanese assistance and were not willing to alienate the Japanese 
government whilst the ROC was still at war with the PRC. All these factors had the result of 
repressing memories of shared wartime history within Taiwan and keeping it hidden in 
Taiwanese dealings with Japan in order to gain Japanese support against China.  
 
Summary of this period 
 In sum, during the early postwar period (1945-1972) Japan and Taiwan's shared 
wartime history was ignored and buried in Japan. This was because the Japanese public and 
political elites wanted to disassociate postwar Japan from wartime Japan and the shared 
wartime history between the two countries was a part of the history that Japanese wanted to 
forget. In addition, the view that the Tokyo Trials constituted the final judgement of the 
military leaders deemed responsible for the war mitigated against any feelings of guilt in 
Japan over the shared history with Taiwan. The poverty and backwardness of postwar Taiwan 
meant that Japan had little to gain by engaging with it and the position of Japan as part of the 
capitalist bloc in the Cold War with American support meant Japan had little need to engage 
in difficult questions of war memory for little gain. The Taiwanese conflict with China and 
the GMD's Sinification efforts meant that the Taiwanese side also preferred to leave the 
shared wartime past buried.  
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III - Attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime history  from 1972 until 
1992 
 I will now examine how attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared 
wartime history from 1972 to 1992 by looking at how different ways in which these attitudes 
were expressed and explain continuity and change from the previous period.  
1. The treatment of Taiwanese nationals by Japanese nationals 
 The discovery of several imperial Japanese soldiers during the 1970s and the 
reception they received in Japan shows that the Japanese public made a stark distinction 
between soldiers who were still Japanese citizens and those who had come from Japan's 
onetime colonies and who were thus no longer Japanese. Shoichi Yokoi was feted upon his 
return to Japan in 1972 and although his references to the Emperor were regarded as 
embarrassing by younger Japanese, he was admired for his determination.
45
 He was lauded as 
a hero at a welcoming ceremony at when he arrived back in Japan, which was televised 
across the country and was afterwards sent money, gifts and even offers of marriage by a 
public that admired his dedication and devotion.
46
 Hiroo Onoda, who returned to Japan in 
1974 after 29 years in the Philippines was welcomed by speeches, parades and ecstatic 
crowds.
47
 The Mainichi Shimbun remarked that “To this soldier, duty took precedence over 
personal sentiments. Onoda has shown us… the spiritual aspect, something we may have 
forgotten.”48 Onoda was provided with a military pension and also signed a $160,000 
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contract for a ghost written memoir entitled ‘No Surrender: My-Thirty Year War.’49 Both 
soldiers were thus given a very warm welcome when they returned to Japan as although they 
were both reminders of the wartime experience, they represented virtues such as loyalty, 
diligence and patriotism which the public found palatable.  
 By contrast, the media frenzy which surrounded Yokoi and Onoda and which briefly 
enveloped Teruo Nakamura quickly dissipated when it was discovered that not only was he 
not Japanese, but he was a Taiwanese aboriginal.
50
 Nakamura was a member of the Amis 
Tribe and had been forced into the Takasago Volunteer Unit of the Imperial Army in 1943, a 
situation distinct from that of Yokoi or Onoda.
51
 Ultimately, Nakamura was offered only half 
the amount paid to other Japanese soldiers for lost wages by the Japanese government.
52
 
Media disquiet over this led the Japanese government to increase this amount to the 
equivalent of 380,000 New Taiwan Dollars (approximately 11700 USD) and Nakamura also 
received donations from Japan, Indonesia and Taiwan
53
 Nakamura chose to return to Taiwan 
where he lived out the rest of his days.
54
 
 As the above cases demonstrate, Nakamura, in contrast to Onoda and Yokoi was 
treated as an embarrassment. Lauding Yokoi and Onoda, despite their anachronistic 
declarations of loyalty to the Emperor, was acceptable as they had always been and remained, 
Japanese. Yet Nakamura, who had once been Japanese, at least legally, but was no longer, 
was a reminder of the empire that for most was an embarrassing memory or not even a 
memory for those under twenty. It is hardly surprising the Japanese media were rather less 
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enthusiastic about reporting on Nakamura when the thorny question of his identity carried 
such implications. However, the commotion which arose in Japan when it was known that 
Nakamura was offered only half the amount paid to Japanese soldiers for lost wages and the 
donations Nakamura received from Japanese demonstrate a modest change in attitudes 
amongst some of the population. Nakamura's choice to return to Taiwan rather than stay in 
Japan was blamed by many in Japan on the Japanese government and the publication of an 
article in the Yomiuri Shimbun with the headline "Let's greet Nakamura as a Japanese! He is 
just like Onoda"
55
 show that a recognition of the shared wartime history between Taiwan and 
Japan in the sense that Taiwanese had fought and suffered as imperial subjects. 
  
2. War Guilt, Culpability and Victimhood 
 With the Tokyo trials seen as a necessity for Japan to endure in order to begin again, 
no strong impetus for the consideration of guilt or culpability was instilled in the Japanese 
population after WWII.  The indifference towards the question of guilt prevailed until the 
mid-1980s,  when the release of the documentary film Tokyo Saiban (The Tokyo Trial) 
provoked public interest in issues of culpability.
56
  
 The victimhood mentality that dates back to the 1950s continued to dominate 
Japanese understanding of the war which ignores the experiences of Japanese colonial 
subjects.
57
 The Japanese public thus continued to see themselves foremost as victims rather 
than perpetrators which prevented connections between Japanese wartime suffering and 
Taiwanese wartime suffering being made. 
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 However the death of the Showa Emperor in 1989 provided a break with the pre-war 
legacy and altered the atmosphere in which discussion of wartime events. The reluctance of 
Hirohito to talk about the Japanese Empire had mitigated open discussion of ideas such as 
war guilt and indeed his role as perpetrator made such discussion politically difficult.
58
 With 
his death, public discussion about war guilt and the wartime experience became easier, 
including discussion of how Japanese aggression and rule affected other countries, such as 
Taiwan. 
3. Narratives of WWII disseminated by the Japanese Government in Japan 
 The  anti-war and anti-military message that Japanese history textbooks had 
disseminated since the beginning of the postwar period began to be seriously challenged in 
the 1980s under the premiership of Yasuhiro Nakasone.
59
 Nakasone strove to make Japan a 
'normal state', meaning a state with a military force that could operate as the forces of other 
states did and could do in collective defence situations.
60
 Nakasone also endeavoured to 
instill a greater national pride in the Japanese population, remarking that " a Japanese people 
who have no interest in Japanese culture and independence... will receive no respect"
61
  These 
efforts to normalise and strengthen a regular military force and nationalism indicate that the 
Japanese government at this time was attempting to break free from restraints that resulted 
from defeat in WWII. The rise in nationalism that Nakasone helped to bring about was 
accompanied by claims by politicians such as Seisuke Okuno, the Director General of Japan's 
National Land Agency who in 1988 claimed that Japan was not the aggressor in WWII and 
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that Japan's aims in the war were defensive.
62
 The rise in nationalism that Japanese 
governments facilitated in the 1980s and the increase in positive views of Japanese 
imperialism that government officials voiced, whilst not directly concerning Taiwan, paved 
the way for the a positive view of Japan and Taiwan's shared history which was developed 
further in later decades. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the calamitous impact it had 
on left-wing parties across the world damaged socialist parties in Japan which were both 
antimilitarist and in favour of apologising for Japan's wartime deeds.
63
Japanese socialist 
parties, along with communists and trade unions published texts from the late 1940s from 
conscripted soldiers, which showed the cruelty of their commanders.
64
 These groups also 
criticised PM Miyazawa in 1991 for failing to apologise for WWII, with the JSP (Japan 
Socialist Party) Chairman Tanabe stating that an apology should be for Asians as well as 
Americans.
65
 
4. Cooperation between the Japanese and Taiwanese Governments 
 The recognition of the PRC by Japan in 1972 and the consequent de-recognition of 
Taiwan meant that cooperation between Japan and Taiwan over issues relating to shared 
wartime history became harder.
66
 The PRC stipulated that the Japanese government must 
regard the PRC government as the only legitimate government of the Chinese people and that 
Taiwan must be regarded as part of the PRC, in addition to abrogating the 1952 treaty with 
the GMD.
67
 Dealing with the shared wartime history between Japan and Taiwan thus became 
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more complex as the PRC claimed Taiwanese citizens and their history as its own. The 
treatment the Japanese government accorded to Teruo Nakamura, culminating in his swift 
repatriation to Japan showed that Taiwanese veterans were merely an difficult problem that 
the Japanese government of the time wanted to pass on to the Taiwanese government, rather 
than a way of cooperating over the shared wartime past. 
  
5. Taiwan's place in Japanese Diplomacy 
 The transfer of legitimacy by Japan from the ROC to the PRC in 1972 made Taiwan 
far less important to Japan diplomatically than it was previously; although  it should be 
pointed out that Taiwan had not been important to Japan in the postwar period even prior to 
1972.  US President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 gave impetus to the move towards 
recognising the PRC in Tokyo
68
;the alliance between Japan and the US made retaining 
recognition of Taiwan even more politically difficult. Nixon’s visit acted as a catalyst on 
figures in Japanese society and media who favoured establishing relations with the PRC and 
the issue quickly dominated foreign policy discussion in the Japanese press.
69
 Nixon's visit to 
China thus acted as a catalyst for the movement of attention in Japanese public and political 
circles away from Taiwan and towards China; with the effect that the shared wartime history 
between Japan and Taiwan was ignored.  
 However, the economic development of Japan's onetime colonies in East Asia, 
including Taiwan but also China and South Korea in the 1980s and the political and cultural 
influence that accompanied their economic exchanges with Japan led to the involvement of 
opinions on war memory that had previously been excluded.
70
 This altered the Cold War 
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context in which Japan had been able to ignore the wartime experience of other East Asian 
countries due to their lack of political and economic clout. With economic development came 
political influence that brought about changes in Japanese diplomacy and views on history.  
 The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about great changes to how war memory 
was discussed in Japan.
71
 The ideological conflict which had brought about the East-West 
rivalry suddenly became moot and conflict over the past took the place of ideological conflict 
in debates between states.
72
 Not only did other East Asian states become more relevant to 
Japan but Japan itself also became less relevant to the US, as the need to contain communism 
was no longer needed. The Gulf War epitomised the chasm between Japanese diplomacy and 
American diplomacy. The inability of the Japanese government to deploy troops, the 
psychological results of decades of pacifism amongst both the public and political elites and 
the derision with which Japan’s financial contribution of $1.4 billion  was met, especially in 
the US, combined to affect change in government policy.
73
 The decline in political relevance 
of Japan to the US increased the need for Japan to establish stronger ties with other countries 
in East Asia and to do so, it needed to  heed the concerns of the countries regarding war 
memory. The economic development of Taiwan and the end of the Cold War thus both 
increased the salience of Taiwan in Japanese diplomacy which in turn raised the issue of the 
shared wartime experience as an issue between Japan and Taiwan. 
  
6. Taiwan's image in Japan 
 Until the late 1980s, Taiwan was an authoritarian state under one-party GMD rule 
which contributed to the unfavourable image of Taiwan in Japan. However, changes in 
Taiwan, such as the 1987 abolition of martial law helped to improve Taiwan's image in 
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Japan
74
 and this helped to change the perception of Taiwan from a state that was beneath 
Japan's notice to one that Japan should engage with and recognise past connections with.  
  The improving of Taiwan’s image in Japan has been concomitant with an increasing 
amount of criticism and suspicion towards the PRC amongst the Japanese populace.
75
 The 
Tiananmen Massacre of June 1989 brought the sense of affinity the Japanese public felt for 
China down to 50%, from a 1980 mark of 78.6%, according to a Japanese government 
survey. This percentage remained at around 50% for rest of the 1990s,
76
 showing that pro-
Chinese feeling in Japan did not recover even after the immediate decline in affinity due to 
the Tiananmen Massacre.  
 By the beginning of the 1990s, Taiwan image in Japan had improved significantly 
whereas that of China has declined. This resulted in a more sympathetic view of Taiwan and 
Taiwanese history in the eyes of the Japanese public and political elites, making recognition 
of the shared wartime history more likely. 
 
7. Identity Politics and Historiography in Taiwan 
 Political changes in Taiwan in the late 1980s and 1990s, especially democratisation 
changed how Taiwanese saw the shared history with Japan. Beginning with the lifting of 
martial law in 1987, social movements not only demanded the end of authoritarian GMD rule 
but also altered perceptions towards history.
77
 The influence of  the localisation movement 
also led to an increasing number of authors writing from a Taiwanese, rather than Chinese 
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perspective.
78
 This localisation movement constituted part of the proliferation of social 
movements in Taiwan which emerged after the lifting of martial law in 1987.
79
 The close 
connection between social movements and political movements in their struggle against the 
GMD and the conception of the virtuous native and his oppression at the hands of 
foreigners
80
 show that the GMD version of history was seen as a pernicious foreign import. 
The localisation of history comprised a stripping away of imported falsehoods and the giving 
of a voice to authentic native history. This opposition to the GMD's imported Chinese (not 
Taiwanese) history and the use of the localisation of history to oppose the GMD resulted in 
the use of the period of Japanese rule by localisation activists to differentiate Taiwan from 
China.
81
 
 Changes in Taiwan at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s had the effect of 
bringing the Taiwanese experience of Japanese rule to public attention after decades of 
exposure to the Chinese experience of Japanese invasion. This dissemination of the 
Taiwanese experience made the Taiwanese shared history with Japan more important for both 
the Taiwanese public and political leadership, who in turn made the issue more important in 
Japan via Taiwanese political pressure and public interest.  The ascent to the presidency of 
Tenghui Lee in 1988, who was educated under Japanese rule and who speaks Japanese 
fluently
82
 also contributed to the discussion of the shared history between Japan and Taiwan. 
Although some Taiwanese held a negative view of Japanese rule, the emergence of localised 
history as a counter to authoritarian GMD-enforced Chinese history helped mould views of 
the Japanese as positive, or at least better than the GMD rule which followed it. This view of 
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the shared history in Taiwan prompted an interest in the shared history in Japan with the 
result that both countries had a more open and positive view of Japan and Taiwan's shared 
history in the early 1990s than at any other stage in the postwar period.  
  
Summary of this period 
 In sum, during the middle postwar period (1972-1992) the indifference or enforced 
ignorance of the earlier (1945-1972) period continued in Japan and Taiwan respectively. 
However, the death of the Showa Emperor, the growing economic importance of Taiwan to 
Japan and the end of the Cold War meant that the shared history between Japan and Taiwan 
attracted more attention in Japan. The effects of democratisation and localisation in Taiwan 
drew more attention to the shared wartime history which in turn attracted more attention to 
the shared wartime history in Japan. 
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IV Attitudes in Japan towards  Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime history from 1992 to the 
present day 
I will now examine how attitudes in Japan towards Japan and Taiwan's shared wartime 
history from 1992 to the present day by looking at how different ways in which these 
attitudes were expressed and explain continuity and change from the previous period. 
 
1. The treatment of Taiwanese nationals by Japanese nationals 
 The political and social changes mentioned during the previous chapter have greatly 
affected how the Japanese public perceives Taiwan. In contrast to the contempt  and 
indifference of earlier times, Taiwanese visiting Japan are generally treated well by the 
Japanese population.  The warmth and friendliness with which Taiwanese tourists are treated 
in Japan contrasts with the lack of interaction between Japanese hosts and Chinese tourists.
83
 
The numbers of Taiwanese and Japanese visiting each others' countries exceeded 4.5 million 
in 2014, with Taiwanese constituting the largest group of foreign tourists in Japan according 
to the Japanese Travel and Tourism Association.
84
 Donations from Taiwan to Japan after the 
2011 Tohoku Earthquake amounted to 20 billion Yen further improved Taiwan's reputation 
amongst the Japanese population. The fury shown in Japan by significant numbers of the 
population towards the then-DPJ's government's adherence to the 'One-China' policy; which 
prevented any Taiwanese presence at events concerning disaster recovery and the gratitude 
shown by the Japanese spectators at a 2013 Japan-Taiwan baseball game for Taiwanese 
generosity regarding the 2011 earthquake show that Taiwanese now have a high reputation in 
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Japan.
85
 This is significant as it has been the people and private business rather than the state 
which has taken the lead in establishing closer ties between Taiwan and Japan, partly due the 
impossibility of establishing official ties due to Japanese recognition of the PRC in 1972.
86
 
The public reaction in Japan to then-Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara's use of the word ' 
Sankokujin' (Third-country person) in 2000 when warning Japanese military personnel that 
foreigners may run rampant after a natural disaster provoked criticism from the Japanese 
public and media.
87
 The word 'Sankokujin' was commonly used in the early postwar period 
(1945-1972) to refer to Koreans and Taiwanese who stayed in Japan after WWII, with 
connotations that such people were of lower status and development.
88
 The much improved 
treatment Taiwanese receive in Japan compared to the early postwar period, the ties between 
the two populations and the intolerance of derogatory language regarding Taiwanese in Japan 
indicates that the Japanese population's view of Taiwanese has improved greatly. The 
importance of the populations of both countries in furthering the bilateral relationship and the 
potential for positive feelings to culminate into a consensus over the shared wartime history 
makes the changes amongst the attitudes of the population important. 
 
2. War Guilt, Culpability and Victimhood 
 The question of war guilt began to be discussed more openly after during this final 
period (1992 to the present day) than was the case previously and the division and 
polarisation of views became more widespread during this stage. The 1995 apology PM 
Tomiichi Murayama for the destruction caused by Japan during WWII received both 
criticism and praise in Japan, with some members of the public saying that Japan should have 
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apologised earlier and others questioning the need for an apology due to perceived 
uncertainty over what actually occurred.
89
 Although this apology was directed towards all 
countries that suffered due to Japan's invasions, the public reaction to it was a harbinger of 
later attitudes that would refuse to acknowledge negative consequences of Japanese rule of 
Taiwan.  
 Questions of guilt and victimhood have been affected in Japanese academia (and 
elsewhere) by the contestation of the  nation-state centred approach to history in the mid-
1990sdue to the influence of cultural studies.
90
 This development was concomitant with an 
emphasis on Japan’s colonies, thus expanding the historical gaze beyond the ‘Japanese 
nation’ and with globalisation, which by its nature entails consideration of factors and forces 
exogenous of the nation-state.
91
 The shared history between Japan and Taiwan has received 
more attention as the boundaries of what is covered by 'history' has expanded beyond national 
borders. However, the inadequacy of the nation-state as a paradigm for historians does not 
apply to the mass of the population for whom the nation-state is the most relatable prism of 
viewing history, thus mitigating the effect of historiographical changes on public views of the 
shared history between Japan and Taiwan. 
 The version of history depicted in museums in Japan almost exclusively focuses on 
the Japanese experience of war and neglects to mention that of others. The Yushukan 
museum lauds the war dead who are enshrined in the Yasukuni shrine which stands in the 
same grounds, as devotees to creating a peaceful nation.
92
 The narrative propagated by the 
museum, that Japan wanted peace but that war was forced on it
93
makes martyrs of those who 
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fought for Japan and in doing so, ignores the existence of non-Japanese who fought for Japan. 
The Showakan and Shokeikan museums do not offer encomia for the wartime Japanese 
soldiery that were on duty but instead focus on the tribulations of the citizenry and wounded 
soldiers respectively.
94
 However, whilst the narratives told are bereft of the glorification of 
the actions of wartime Japan that are found at Yushukan, yet the exclusive emphasis on the 
Japanese experience and the absence of any explanation as to why the events depicted took 
place
95
 are of no avail in aiding understanding the effect the empire had on the peoples that 
were subjugated. The contrast of the above museums with the Okinawa Prefectural Peace 
Park Memorial Museum  and the Himeyuri Memorial and Museum are stark. In contrast to 
those previously mentioned, those on Okinawa explain  why the war took place and also 
explain the effects of the war outside of Japan.
96
 That the only museum to explicitly state the 
Japanese contribution towards starting WWII and its effect on Japan’s empire (outside of the 
centre) is located on Okinawa, far from the eyes of most Japan indicates that museums in 
Japan, through pro-peace, root that desire for peace in the suffering of Japanese during 
wartime, to the exclusion of any other people, thus propagating the sense of national 
victimhood. The lack of information on the Taiwanese experience of Japanese rule or 
wartime experience as Japanese subjects helps to perpetuate ignorance in Japan about the 
shared wartime history with Japan. 
 Among the general public, a 2013 poll showed that 48% of the population felt that the 
Japanese government had apologised adequately for the actions of the 1930s and 1940s and 
another 15% thought no apology was needed. This total of 63% was exceeded among young 
Japanese, of whom 73% of those aged between 18 and 29 thought that apologies were 
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unnecessary or that existing ones were sufficient.
97
 Intimidation by nationalist activists of 
journalists and media organisations which criticise nationalist narratives of WWII also 
indicate the increasing influence and prevalence of groups that see Japanese imperialism in 
Taiwan as a positive development.
98
 Furthermore, the Japanese public’s respect for Japanese 
soldiers who died fighting for the empire remains strong, yet this respect is accorded only to 
Japanese soldiers who would be Japanese today, not colonial citizens.
99
  Efforts by  
academics such as Nobukasu Fujioka and Nishio Kanji to remove from history textbooks 
elements they see as undermining patriotism indicate that opposition to recognition of the 
legacy of Japan’s wartime actions remains active.100 These results and developments indicate 
that the Japanese public regards the wartime past as something that doesn't require further 
apology and this attitude likely demonstrates a continuance of the immediate postwar desire 
to move on from the past.   
 
3. Narratives of WWII disseminated by the Japanese Government in Japan 
 Since 1992 there have been numerous statements made by Japanese politicians that 
recognise the suffering causes by Japanese imperialism. The Kono Statement of 1993 by the-
then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in which he stated that the Japanese military forced 
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many Japanese subjects, principally Koreans, to become 'comfort women'  (sex slaves)
101
 was 
unprecedented and generated a great deal of interest both inside and outside Japan, especially 
South Korea where many of the surviving 'comfort women' lived.
102
 The 1995 apology by 
PM Tomiichi Murayama for the destruction caused by Japan's invasions received a mixed 
reception in Japan. The apology was both lauded and criticised by both members of the 
public and political elites, with the then education minister Yoshinobu Shimamura expressing 
doubt on whether apologies were useful and even whether Japan had been an aggressor or not 
during the war.
103
 The reactions to these apologies show that the Japanese public and political 
elites are divided on the legacy of the Japanese Empire and whether it requires apologies or 
not, this applies to Taiwan as well. 
 Conversely other comments by Japanese political elites have shown a desire to 
prevent foreign influence on the Japanese wartime past and to promote a more favourable 
view of the Japanese Empire. The declaration by former PM Yoshiro Mori in 2000 that Japan 
is a divine nation with the Emperor at its centre provoked strong criticism from citizens' 
groups, the political opposition and even his own cabinet; culminating in an apology in the 
Upper House of the Diet.
104
  In  2015, Koichi Haguida, an aide to PM Abe, urged the PM not 
to let foreign countries use the Japanese wartime past to make diplomatic gains.  Abe’s allies 
believed that apologising for the war detracts from the peaceful post-war record and the 
foreign countries shouldn't use the Japanese wartime past as leverage over the current 
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Japanese government.
105
 These comments show that some political elites have sought to 
rehabilitate wartime Japan but also to recast Japan's shared history its erstwhile empire as 
solely Japanese history. This would not only de-legitimise foreign criticism of 'Japan's 
history' but also strengthen the government's hand in promoting a national history that, in the 
words of PM Abe, would produce a 'beautiful country' bereft of foreign criticism or 
unpalatable facts about Japanese rule.
106
 
 History textbooks are another means through which the Japanese government  has 
promoted a certain view of WWII. The 'Society for History Textbook Reform' which is not a 
government organisation but which has sympathisers in government including PM Abe who 
led the organisation in 1997 when he was also an LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) MP.
107
  
The Society for History Textbook Reform promoted the view that that Japan liberated, rather 
than invaded many Asian countries during WWII, that Japanese troops were no worse than 
the soldiers of other armies and that ‘masochistic’ education is producing school leavers who 
think it virtuous to despise Japan.
108
 The attainment of high office by Abe who support the 
teaching of a nationalist history has resulted in the obfuscation of Japanese misdeeds in 
government narratives and therefore a disinclination to recognise the negative elements of the 
shared history between Japan and Taiwan. 
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4. Cooperation between the Japanese and Taiwanese Governments 
 There have been disputes between Japan and Taiwan over ownership of the Pinnacle 
Islands (known in Japan as尖閣諸島 Senkaku Shotou and Taiwan as 釣魚台Diaoyu Dao), 
such as in 1995 when Japanese right-wing organisations built a lighthouse on the islands.
109
 
Similar disputes have also erupted between Japan and Taiwan over the disputed Okinotori 
Island/Atoll in 2016, with the Taiwanese leadership vigorously defending the rights of 
Taiwanese fisherman to fish around the disputed territory.
110
 However, there have also been 
occasions of cooperation between Japan and Taiwan.  The two countries succeeded in 
reaching agreement in 2013 over fishing grounds, with the agreement concluding that further 
Japan-Taiwan cooperation will be more likely due to the fishing agreement achievement.
111
 
The efforts among some LDP legislatures, such as Nobuo Kishi, the younger brother of PM 
Abe, to create a Japan-Taiwan Relations Act was favourably reported upon by some 
Taiwanese media outlets.
112
 Finally, with the election of Ingwen Tsai in January 2016 as 
DDP (Democratic Progressive Party), the time seems ripe for more Japan-Taiwan 
cooperation. This is due to Tsai's position as head of the DPP, a party that opposes 
'reunification'  with China. In Taiwan, to be anti-China is usually to be pro-Japanese and the 
cold reception China gave to Tsai's election will naturally steer Tsai closer towards Japan.   
Cooperation between Japan and Taiwan is thus greater now than at any point in the past with 
the prospects for greater cooperation appearing promising. With this in mind, the potential for 
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convergence between Japanese and Taiwanese views of the shared past may be high, with 
Tsai's desire to improve maritime ties with Japan a possible sign of things to come.
113
 
5. Taiwan's place in Japanese Diplomacy 
 The changes regarding war memory in Japan that came about in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, such as the exposure to the views of Taiwanese and others about 
WWII have continued since then. Although Japan has once again become useful to the US, 
this time as a bulwark against China, the importance of Taiwan and others, such as South 
Korea, in influencing Japanese war memory is not going to return to the insignificance of the 
1970s or before then due to such countries' economic importance. Togo has written that war 
responsibility is one of the five longstanding issues in diplomacy that remains unresolved
114
 
and therefore, the increased diplomatic relevance of Taiwan to Japan has given Taiwan a 
greater say on the issue of war responsibility and the shared wartime experience in general. 
The souring of Japan's relations with China by the early 1990s has meant that Taiwan has 
become more important to Japan. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis not only exacerbated 
anti-Chinese feeling in Japan but also created considerable sympathy for Taiwan while 
simultaneously deepening the suspicions of Japanese governments regarding Chinese 
goals.
115
 The informal yet extensive political ties between Japanese and Taiwanese 
politicians
116
 and visits by high-level Taiwanese politicians to Japan, such as Ingwen Tsai in 
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2015, albeit before she became president
117
show that the two countries regard each other as 
diplomatically significant.  
6. Taiwan's image in Japan 
 The image of Taiwan in Japan has continued to improve since 1992. Ties between the 
political elites of two countries and the cultural and tourist links between the populations has 
drawn the two countries closer together, strengthened further by Taiwan’s status the only 
Japan-friendly state in East Asia
118
 The 2000 and 2008 peaceful democratic transfers of 
power to the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) and GMD respectively, improved Taiwan’s 
image in Japan.
119
 The defeat of the GMD in the 2000 election, identity debates and relations 
with the PRC have provoked greater interest in Taiwan among Japanese scholars. Taiwan has 
become a place worthy of study in its own right, not just as an appendage of China.
120
 This 
scholarly interest has some effect on both the public and political leaders and as a result, the 
image of Taiwan in Japan has improved. The  generosity displayed by the people of Taiwan 
in 2011, when they donated US$260 million to Japan brought the two peoples closer with 
some Japanese journeying to Taiwan to hold events to thank Taiwanese in person for the 
donations.
121
 
 In popular culture, the comic (aka Manga) On Taiwan (臺灣論) by the Japanese 
comic book writer Kobayashi Kobayashi depicts Taiwan as a place where 'Japanese' virtues 
are preserved, in contrast to Japan itself, where they have been lost.
122
 Kobayashi also 
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stresses the modernisation that took place under Japanese rule, with his work replete with 
references to agriculture and transportation.
123
 Kobayashi also includes comments by 
Taiwanese who share his positive view of Japanese rule, strengthening the author's 
conclusion that Japan was a benevolent master and that Japanese today do not need to feel 
ashamed about ancestors who were involved in Japanese imperialism.
124
  
The result of  Kobayashi's work is to strengthen the view in Japan that Japan is responsible 
for Taiwanese development and that the shared history between two is something to be 
celebrated, rather than be ashamed of.  
 The positive opinion Japanese have of Taiwan and the ability of the two publics to 
think well of each other is especially important when the reputations of China and South 
Korea in Japan are considered.  The rise of nationalism in China and South Korea have 
also strengthened nationalism in Japan as the place of Japan as invader and occupier in both 
Chinese and South Korean nationalisms piques a counter reaction in Japan.
125
 The increase in 
nationalism in which Japan was the designated enemy in China and South Korea after the 
1990s, due to economic development of those countries and their decreasing dependence of 
Japanese technology for modernisation has increased Japanese public awareness of Japanese 
actions in the  1930s and 1940s but also encouraged a counter reaction amongst nationalists 
in Japan.  The relentless criticism aimed at Japan by the Chinese and South Korean 
governments and publics also highlights the generally positive Taiwanese attitude towards 
Japan and thus improves the image of Taiwan in Japan. The positive image of Japan in 
Taiwan lends itself to a convergence of interpretation on the shared wartime history, which, 
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as Japan and Taiwan are friendly to each other and both feel threatened by China, tends 
towards a positive interpretation of Japanese rule of Taiwan. 
 
7. Identity Politics and Historiography in Taiwan 
 The  localisation movement in Taiwan resulted in important historiographical 
changes. These changes were epitomised by the adoption of a new subject in the secondary 
school curriculum in 1997, entitled ‘Knowing Taiwan’ (認識台灣) which aimed to examine the 
history of Taiwanese from a Taiwanese perspective.
126
 The publishing of Taiwanese 
veterans’ oral accounts in 1997 constituted the first time since the end of the war that such 
accounts of the war entered public discourse.
127
 A special exhibition entitled ‘Exhibition of 
Taiwanese People’s Wars’ (台灣人戰爭展) was also held in 1997 by the Taipei Municipal 
Government. The inclusion of personal effects and historical records pertaining to Taiwanese 
who had fought for Japan made the exhibition the first government event held in Taiwan that 
publicly featured such soldiers as the focus of the event.
128
 In contrast to the Sinocentric 
narrative propagated by the GMD since the end of Japanese rule, these new historiographical 
perspectives cast new attention on Taiwanese who fought for Japan, both at the level of the 
public and those of the political elite. These historical investigations and exhibits were and 
are highly political; the goal of “demanding debt-payment and seeking compensation” was, 
along with “experiences in overseas battlefield” and “reflection on postwar experiences” was 
stated as one of the three main themes at a seminar held in 1995.
129
 Taiwanese veterans have 
also criticised Japanese colonial discourse, particularly those of assimilation and impartiality, 
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arguing that the different treatment afforded to Japanese compared to erstwhile Japanese 
subjects after WWII make a mockery of such pretensions.
130
 The voicing of experiences 
which had previously lain dormant therefore inevitably exerted an effect on interpretations of 
the shared history between Taiwan and Japan.  
 However, the narrative of the period of Japanese rule continues to be dominated by 
the imported GMD narrative. Official narratives of WWII continue to focus on the GMD’s 
opposition to Japan in China and neglect the experiences of Taiwanese who fought for Japan, 
with the effect that the existence of the latter is not widely known amongst the Taiwanese 
population.
131
  Events held by the state, such as the WWII victory parade in 2015 in which 
the President Ma sought to claim credit for the GMD for defeating Japan
132
 shunt aside the 
role that some Taiwanese played in fighting for Japan and further the pre-democratisation 
narrative propagated by the GMD that replaced the actual series of events in Taiwan with an 
imported Chinese narrative. The lack of ceremonies to commemorate the 200,000 Taiwanese 
soldiers who served Japanese as Japanese subjects and the misperception amongst many 
Taiwanese that Taiwanese were fighting against, rather than for Japan during WWII
133
 
indicate the paucity of presence Taiwanese veterans of the Japanese imperial military possess 
in Taiwanese popular culture. This prevailing ignorance about the existence Taiwanese 
soldiers who served Japan reduces the political importance of the issue in Taiwan, which in 
turn reduces its impact on the Japan-Taiwan relationship.  
 Despite the celebration of independence at the end of WWII and criticism of Japanese 
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rule, praise for Japanese rule has also been voiced by both political elites and the public. The 
ex-President Yingjiu Ma remarked in 2015 that the good things Japan did for Taiwan should 
not be forgotten.
134
 This view is broadly shared by much of the Taiwanese population
135
and 
considering that Ma, as a GMD president belonged to a party generally defined as pro-China 
and anti-Japanese, spoke of the benefits of Japanese rule, speaks volumes on Taiwanese 
views on their history with Japan. 
 
Summary of this period 
 In sum, from 1992 to the present day  Japanese views on the shared history with 
Taiwan have become positive. The close relationship between the Japanese and Taiwanese 
people, and to an extent, their governments, have created an atmosphere conducive to 
cooperation and mutual influence, unlike Japan's ties with China or South Korea. The growth 
of nationalism in Japan has garnered some criticism in Taiwan, yet the agreement of the 
Japanese LDP with the Taiwanese DDP on the value of Japanese rule of Taiwan and the 
danger posed by China has done much to damage the Japan-Taiwan relationship. The 
growing relevance of Japan and Taiwan to each other diplomatically and the generally 
positive view of Japanese rule on Taiwan by Japanese and Taiwanese, are harbingers of a 
move towards historiographical consensus. 
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V Conclusion 
 In conclusion, Japanese attitudes towards Japan and Taiwan's shared history have 
moved from one of ignorance and indifference before the late 1980s; after which, Japanese 
generally think of Japan and Taiwan's shared history positively. This change has come about 
due to a plethora of factors, the most important of which are the economic and political 
development of Taiwan; the existence of Taiwan as an island of friendship to Japan in a sea 
of enemies; the democratisation and localisation movements in Taiwan and simply that; 
depending on one's values, Japanese rule was good for Taiwan. In contrast to the Qing 
Manchu and the Chinese GMD, the Japanese did more for Taiwanese than either their 
predecessors or immediate successors. Yes, Japanese rule was a form of colonialism and 
imperialism yet, the same can be said of the Manchu and the GMD, neither of whom did 
much for Taiwanese development, at least not for the first thirty years of GMD rule.  
 The political polarisation in Japan over Japanese rule of Taiwan that I hypothesised is 
to some extent true, yet I am inclined to think that positive rather than negative views of the 
shared history dominate in both Japan and Taiwan. My hypothesis that the increasing 
saliency of internal factors would prove decisive is valid as without the democratisation and 
localisation movements in Taiwan, the growth in the economic and political importance of 
Taiwan of Japan and the resultant influence of Taiwan on Japanese public and political elites 
would never have come to pass. The inveterate criticism from China and South Korea over 
Japan's wartime history also pushed Japan and Taiwan together as Taiwan was the only 
country friendly towards Japan.  Without these factors, Japanese would likely have continued 
to ignore Taiwan, rather than paying it attention, with the end result that both Japanese and 
Taiwanese, for the most part, have a positive view of the shared history between them.  
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